

Emotion and Cognition*

by

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“Our civilization is still in a middle stage, scarcely beast, in that it is no longer guided by instinct, scarcely human, in that it is not wholly guided by reason.”

THEODORE DRESIER, *Sister Carrie*

"And in connection with emotion, eidetic reflection will ask: after all, what is to be moved; what is the meaning of emotion? Can one conceive of a consciousness which is incapable of emotion, and if not, why not? One will understand emotion as a total act of consciousness, as a mode of our relation to the entire world, and one will seek to determine its sense."

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, *The Primacy of Perception*

0. Introduction: Apollonians versus Dionysians

The counterpoint of values which contrasts sober reason and affective nature of human beings, according to the old Greek mythic symbolism of Apollonian virtues and Dionysian features, reappears in Nietzsche's philosophical work for basically the same purpose, namely, in order to sort out two global aspects of art, two different kinds of acting, thinking and knowing. By contrasting Apollonians and Dionysians he did not only aim to representing two distinct kinds of creativity, but also wanted to highlight the existence of two discrepant sorts of knowledge, and in a final instance to their resulting dissimilar pictures of the world. Even nowadays we can do no better than to make use of the same economic means of representation by which the two symbolic labels are taken to discriminate two spheres of human action and thought: the realm of the rational and the one contrary to it. .

More recently in an attempt to select two dominant and different trends in scientific epistemology, Gerald Holton (1979, Ch. 3) takes advantage of the same terminology in order to distinguish two trends in the philosophy of science. Thus he calls supporters of the reduction of scientific rationality to formal logical-mathematical operations the "new Apollonians" and those who are critical of such reductionism the "new Dionysians". This transfer of the terminology into the philosophy of science is intended to make transparent the dividing line that exists within the scientific community: on one side, those who think that only rationality based on strictly logical-mathematical operations is truly relevant in the matters of science; on the other side, those who are suspicious of the narrowing of such a sort, and who point to the limitations of such a conception of scientific thought.

Werner Heisenberg was conscious of the danger entailed in the glorification of the rational component of scientific reason, which leads to a one-sided, that is,

fragmentary and inadequate, conception not only of science, but of the mind too. He is concerned with (in our terms - Apollonian) the reduction of the picture of the world on its scientific-technological component which leads to a deficient conception of the world in which entire sphere of the nonrational is overlooked or neglected.

The dominant influence of science and technology has so overstressed the rational aspect of the world that a reaction against this overemphasis seems quite unavoidable; or to put it in Nietzsche's words, that in desperation at the emptiness and suffering of such a world the god Dionysus should again make his appearance. In all these irrational doings there is probably an unconscious expression of longing for that world in which mind is more than information, love more than sexuality and science more than the collection and analysis of empirical data. (Heisenberg: 1974, 211-212)

In all the various uses of the classification the underlying polarity remains the same and it can be represented through the dualistic antagonism of rationality and phantasy, logic and emotion, exactness and ambiguity, precision and vagueness, calculation and intuition, factuality and fiction, etc. This may further lead to the split between the cerebral and the affective, and in a final instance to the alienation of the mind from the body.

The trend continues to live in modern neuro-psychological studies. It has been particularly nourished by the neuroscientific research on the so-called split-brains, best known through experiments done by Roger Sperry, Michael Gazzaniga and others. Split-brain surgery seemed to be revealing a profound psychological dichotomy between verbal skill, cognition and thinking (affiliated with the left brain hemisphere) and non-verbal expression, emotion and intuition (located within the right brain hemisphere). "One Brain - Two Minds" - that is how Gazzaniga named one of his early articles on the topic. (Consequently, I guess, one might be tempted to talk of the "right mind" and "left mind".) Though more recent discoveries do not speak in favor of the strict exclusiveness of two hemispheres (e.g. it is just that the emotional stimuli 'leak' across the brain connecting both of its parts) the idea of the two distinct selves is still the dominating paradigm.

Another development that favored such a dichotomy comes from the cognitive science - a multidisciplinary enterprise that emerged around the middle of the past century, and is often described as the "new science of mind" (Gardner, 1987). However, the mind that cognitive scientists address is the rationally operating intellectual system devoid of emotionality. Emotions seem to be out of their concern for two reasons: first, they are too complex to be traced down in the brain, and, second, their nature contradicts logical behavior on which cognitivists base their conception of the mind.

The apollonian-dionysian rivalry seemed to be revitalized under considerable impact of Russell's primacy of the logical and Fodor's "language of thought". It got its final expression in the powerful, and overused, computer-metaphor ("mind is a computer").

However, I think (or want to hope) that meanwhile we have advanced in our philosophical maturation so that we realize that neither is cognition so logical as it once appeared to be, nor is emotion uneducated and unreasonable, as the traditional stereotyp teaches us.

Emotions might appear not to be *rational* (and certainly not logical) but they nevertheless may be *reasonable*.

“Emotions, after all – to quote Joseph LeDoux, one of the most prominent experts on the “emotional brain” – are the threads that hold mental life together. They define who we are in our own mind’s eye as well as in the eyes of others. What could be more important to understand about the brain than the way it makes us happy, sad, afraid, disgusted, or delighted” (LeDoux, 1996: 11)

It is this subtle neglect of the boundaries between emotion and reason that is going to be my major concern in what follows.

1. On 'Blindness' of Emotions

A common and widespread metaphorical means of representing emotions is that of 'blindness' which relies consequently on an analogon of 'light' as a metaphor, which refers to the power of reason. The signification of this language usage is clear: the 'light' attributed to reason suggests that the power of mental 'enlightenment' makes things 'visible', that is, understandable and explainable; on the contrary, the emotional 'darkness' makes us 'blind' and thus incapable for any cognitive achievement. So to 'live in darkness' is a metaphor for ignorance, while any use of 'enlightenment' refers metaphorically to gaining of knowledge. Any expression that falls within one or the other label gets a corresponding clear-cut meaning. Linking of emotion to 'darkness' and 'blindness' provides accordingly an unambiguous placing of emotion in the world of ignorance.

The symbolism of 'light' and 'darkness' in this context may be useful because it helps us recognise the distinctive features of rational thought, on the one hand, and emotional-intuitive part of our being, on the other hand, yet it also deceives us for, due to the contrasting terminology, it creates an impression that the two are not only distinct but also mutually alien. The resulting message has been for long already established as a habit of thought according to which, while being *masters* of the mind, we can at best be *slaves* of our feelings. This is very much in accord with the view which sees no reason in emotion and so also no possibility of influencing them. Emotions are simply had or they happen (somewhat like natural phenomena to which we are exposed but to which we have no impact), as if they come from some mysterious, rationally not explainable sources. According to such a conception it is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute to emotions any cognitive relevance for they always remain apart from the cognitive structure, exclusively captured within the bodily sphere (where body is taken merely as physical entity).

Another form of common conceptualization of emotions is the one which links the emotional with the lower, instinct-like layers of our being habitually understood as an authentic feature of animal nature. It is this uncritical affiliation of emotional states with the animal which contributes to the enforcing of the polarity between the rational mind (which alone is perceived as distinctive human feature) and the emotional embodiment (characteristic of animal life, and so incompatible with what typically constitutes human nature). For that reason does this kind of sorting, which divines the mind and scorns the emotional, deserves appropriate critical approach.

However, I claim, emotions are not just had and feelings are not merely felt. They are experienced in a way which does not exclude intervening of reason, and reason itself is not as 'pure' as to be completely freed from feelings. The 'cogito' itself remains undefined and questionable, and in an urgent need for critical reexamination respecting the growing knowledge from interdisciplinary sources on knowledge-processes and functions of the mind. Now, such a turn requires a revision of some of our basic notions of epistemology and philosophy of mind.

A possible way toward a global revision of the above expounded stereotype might just be in an attempt to show that the very concept of feeling and emotion as something devoid of meaning, that is, cognitively 'blind', is not only inadequate but also false. For instance, in formulating the gist of William James' theory of emotion, John Wild puts it in clear terms, and says of feeling that

... it is *never a blind*, visceral reaction without cognitive meaning of any kind. (Wild, 1970: 407; emphasis added)

Here lies explicit answer to the above-expounded dilemma concerning 'blindness' of emotions. And once it is unambiguously pronounced that emotions as we know them in humans cannot be deprived of any cognitive relevance the road is opened for further assumptions about their relation to the thought processes, on the one hand, and the world we live in, on the other hand.

According to James it is through feeling that the objects of perception and thought are subjectively assimilated into the life-world and evaluated. If perception and thought could ever be completely separated from feeling, which is not the case, they would be neutral to what we call value. *It is primarily through feeling that values are grasped.* (Wild, 1970: 407; emphasis added)

Such with meaning impregnated feelings are nothing like an obstacle for the reasonable behaviour and gaining of knowledge. On the contrary, they do the service in cognitive processes, which the rational mechanisms alone cannot do.

It [feeling] is pervaded with *meaning* and *value*. It is not a chaotic manyfold of impressions but is held together in a temporal horizon that surrounds them and places them in a *field of meaning* that limits our perspective but at the same time lures us on. Even at the level of pure conceptual experience, these firings of meaning are dimly felt, and it is through them that we gain our sense of transition and tendency, and our *total orientation in the world*. The direction in which we are moving is *felt* rather than methodically thought through by clearly defined concepts. And even in the processes of conceptual thinking, the sense of what we are about to say, but have not yet said, is provided by feeling. (Wild, 1970: 69; emphasis added)

It is possible to find contemporary echoes of such a view even when the parallels are not always explicitly stated. For example, Eugene T. Gendlin's idea of 'felt sense' as elaborated in his (1962) work and in a number of other essays, which does not correspond in an immediate way to James' ideas illustrated above, roots nevertheless in the same basic conviction that the rational and the intuitive, the logical and the

implicit coexist within a relation of mutual interdependence. Similarly, in Tiemersma's concept of 'muscle sense' (1989) one can also find elements that accord with Jamesian conception of feeling.

Another aspect, closely associated with that of the 'blindness', is a widespread belief that emotions are states captured 'within' the subject. It belongs already to the habit of thought that emotions are perceived as something exclusively innermost private and for that reason purely subjectiv; they originate within ourselves and are directed to the inward subjectiv sphere. Quite contrary, there are reasons enough for the support of the view that this is but another fallacy commonly associated with the nature and function of emotions. For emotions do not arise in vacuum, in an isolation from the context of external events, but are in principle first of all reactions to stimulation from the external or the so called objective world. What we feel is thus not wordless. What we feel is an emotional response to what happens in the world.

It seems appropriate at this point to quote Mikel Dufrenne, who brings the point in clear terms: "To feel is to experience a feeling as a property of the object, not as a state of my being." (1973: 442)

Much in the same spirit reasons also Michael Polanyi, for he too does not place emotions, or passions as he rather prefers to say, in the ivory tower of privacy and subjectivity.

Yielding to our intellectual passions, we desire to become more satisfying to ourselves, and accept an obligation to educate ourselves by the standards which our passions have set to ourselves. In this sense these *passions are public, not privat*: they delight in cherishing something *external* to us, for its own sake. Here is indeed the fundamental difference between appetites and mental interests. ... while appetites are guided by standards of private satisfaction, a passion for mental excellence believes itself to be fulfilling *universal obligations*. (Polanyi, 1964: 174; emphasis added)

I have no illusion to be able to provide all the necessary arguments to convincingly support the claim that "feeling illuminats knowledge and knowledge illuminates feeling" (Brown, 1982: 121), for this can certainly not be done within the confines of this essay (and such a monunental issue is not aimed at here). Yet, there is a hope that a basic premise can be outlined as to enable us to realize that emotions are 'more than bodily reactions'. If we have 'opened' emotional experience toward mental functions that are cognitively rewarding, our conception of cognition as totally isolated from the bodily-emotional complex cannot be maintained any further. Once mutuality of the sort has been established the precondition has been created to move from a picture of devided men to a notion of integrated human subject or, better to say, person.

2. Towards the Concept of Emotional Reason or "The whole man counts"

Having realized that passivity of emotions is questionable, that feelings do not dwell isolated in an "animal department" of our being, that being affected does not mean be unable to "see" in a way which is cognitively rewarding, we can now proceed toward a

more thorough examination of the emotion-reason relation. The now somewhat reduced scope of the problem touches more immediately upon the aspects of interrelatedness of that what is standardly considered to belong to pure reason and that what is classified as its incompatible irrational part. The presupposed possibility of mutual interaction between the two domains asks for the reexamination of justification of a belief that there exists such a dividing line [and also that it is stable and unshiftable]. Further, it requires critical confrontation with the assumption about the harmful effect of the irrationality of emotions upon the rational mind as well as about the denial of the very possibility of the rational to influence the emotional.

It was already Freud who indicated that emotions cannot be pre- or unconscious: "It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness. So for emotions, feelings, and affects to be unconscious would be quite out of the question." (Freud, 1959: 109) Others maintained too that consciousness is "ordered and coloured by affect". In a sort of conclusion Carroll E. Izard puts forward that "[a]ffect is so constant and pervasive in consciousness that it is difficult to separate emotion as structure from consciousness itself " (Izard, 1977: 141)

From acknowledging that emotional does not automatically imply unconscious to the accepting that affect can be viewed as an aspect of the rational thought is still a long way. Yet, at least the assumption builds a sort of prerequisite for getting rid of the conception of a "split man" and opens up the road toward an integrated picture of human being whose cognitive structure is not compartmentalized but functionally interconnected. Grounded on such a supposition there arises a conception of human being that is not divided into a purposeful, machine-like, rational reason and an unstable, irrational, and emotional part. Put in somewhat elementary but appropriate terms:

Human beings are material systems, to be sure, and subject to the laws of nature, but they are *alive*. With them comes into the material world a breath of uncertainty and of excitement. They are not automata, but creatures who think and *feel*; whose problems center around mind, soul, and spirit - the *emotions*, purposes, values, and ideals of man. (Sinnott, 1966: 88; emphasis added)

To those who are ready to accept that some lower or simple intellectual functions are influenced by emotional states but are reluctant to accept a possibility that more complex functions of intellect, as for instance theoretical thought, there is a message from William James:

... *the whole man within us* is at work when we form our philosophical opinions. Intellect, will, taste, and passion co-operate just as they do in practical affairs. (James, 1956: 92)

According to James, all thought is situated. Not even the philosophical thought is exempt from this pattern. And this, as we learn from John MacMurray is not something we can or should suppress. It sounds both as warning and as recommendation that

we have to learn to live with the *whole of our bodies*, not only with our heads. If we do this, we shall find ourselves able to act in the world with *the*

whole of our bodies, and our actions will be spontaneous, emotional, non-mechanical and free. (MacMurray, 1935: 45; emphasis added)

Creativity (and one can add, both artistic and scientific) involves the whole of our being. It is indeed difficult to imagine (though such theoretical approaches are pretty common) that one type of creativity (say, science) requires a part of our selves (a rational one), while for other sort of creativity (for example, art) activation of another section of our being (an intuitive one) suffices. Neither is science the matter of merely logical and rational, nor is art not more than intuitive and imaginative. Science is not exclusively a product of 'thinking man', nor does art result merely from the activity of an 'emotional man'. Put in a more pictorial terms the description may sound: science does not arise thanks only to our 'head', and art is not just a matter of our gut feelings.

... creativeness is a characteristic which belongs to personality in its *wholeness*, acting as a *whole*, and not to any of its parts acting separately. ... Their *wholeness* and their direct awareness of the world express itself in action which is graceful and beautiful, because they are emotionally alive and in direct contact with the world. There is nothing strange or marvelous about this. That is the way human beings are made. (MacMurray, 1935: 45; emphasis added)

However, rationalistic tradition in philosophy and long dominance of scientism as manifested in logical-empiristic and positivistic tradition has developed such conceptual system which provides no place for a position of the sort. Consequently there has been little understanding for the synthesis which proclaims unified cognitive person. Yet, after the post-modern 'turn' we should now be in a better position to appreciate the reconception outlined here. It (re)establishes the creator of the *humiverse* as an undivided creative being whose professional specializations cannot change anything in the elementary truth that "the whole man counts".

Most philosophers, therefore, restrict our experience on the side of feeling and will as at the same time they indifferently prolong it on the side of thought. What James asks of us is not to add too much to experience through hypothetical considerations, and also not to mutilate it in its solid elements. We are absolutely sure only of what experience gives us; but we should experience *wholly*, and our feelings are a part of it by the same right as our perceptions, consequently, by the same right as 'things'. In the eyes of William James, *the whole man counts*. (Bergson, 1946: 211-212; emphasis added) [Quoted by J.McDermott in his Introduction to *The Writings of William James*, p. xxxi.]

The establishing of the wholeness of our mental capacity or, more generally, of the unity of being endangers both sides of the dualistic construction; the rationalistic part can no longer claim its autonomous status in relation to the emotional (and consequently challenges the supposed superiority and dominance of the mind over the body); the consequences are equally 'uncomfortable' for the 'irrationalists' who defend authenticity of the non-rational (also taken as synonymous for the emotional) just by preventing any possible affiliation with the reasonable. Charles Frankel brings the point in a suitable manner:

The Irrationalist's theory of human nature is steeped in the tradition of the dualistic psychology it condemns. It talks about "reason" as though it were a department of human nature in conflict with "emotions". But "reason", considered as a psychological process, is not a special faculty, and it is not separate from the emotions; it is simply the process of reorganizing the emotions. (Frankel, 1973: 930)

All this amounts to the aimed revision of the standard view on emotion that should allow us to make a final step in its emancipation from the irrational and claim that there is a place of emotion in the world of science, and that it is not merely psychological.

3. On Affective Aspect of Science

What once might have sound as a heresy, or at least be unconvincing, is nowadays in a much better position to be perceived with understanding:

But even strong emotions, such as love or hatred or anger, may sharpen the focus of our attention, quicken our apprehension of the object upon which they are directed, and lead to the *recognition of truth*, and even of *facts*, which otherwise would have escaped our notice. (MacMurray, 1961: 33; emphasis added)

At this point, Frederick Sontag's remark that uniformity of truth is an illusion that does not fit, seems to be more than wellcome. According to his view, not only certainty, which finds support in rational thought, can claim for truthfulness, but also uncertainty, as manifested in emotionality, can pretend to capture a truth. An associative link with modern scientific developments (e.g. that of quantum physics) is certainly not unfounded, and it may give rise to a conviction/confidence about how right the author is in bringing the point, and making us aware that rationalistic *clare et distincte* principle is neither self-evident nor unique (that is, sufficient) criteria of truth.

I suggest that any truth tends not to be one thing. And although it is complex and contains a tendency toward instability, emotion provides one means we need to understand the structure of all things. Reason alone would overlook uncertainty, because, Descartes is right, its nature is to search for certainty. *If uncertainty lies at the heart of truth, emotion is needed for our search. It provides a power without which decision cannot be reached.* (Sontag, 1989: 13-14)

Once the stereotype which keeps the 'Dionysian' and 'Apollonian' sphere strictly apart is removed, or at least attacked, and once we accept that emotions may bear relevance for truth and factuality, we have implicitly admitted that there is a place for emotions in the world of science.

Presently, I am not going to make any further steps which might lead us as far as to outlining the concept of 'affective facts'. Let me for the current purposes just

concentrate on the reasons (and supporting elements that can be found) for the justification of the belief that not only scientific heuristics, but also scientific facts themselves are not devoid of value, or more specifically, that what counts as the highest product*/outcome* of rationality cannot be totally isolated from emotionality.

Arthur Koestler is one of the not so many theorists who was consistent in fighting the reduction of science to empirical striving for facts. Equally so he rejects the maintenance of the stereotype according to which are literature and art the type of activity whose creativity roots in the sphere of the nonrational.

But we have seen that the equation of science with logic and reason, of art with intuition and emotion, is a blatant popular fallacy. No discovery has even been made by logical deduction; no work of art produced without calculating craftsmanship; the *emotive games* of the unconscious enter into both. (Koestler, 1969: 264)

Koestler rightly points to the emotive basis of all creativity, scientific as well as artistic, and even more justified is his insisting on the mutual interdependence between logical reasoning (attributed to science) and emotion (affiliated with art). However, it seems that Koestler connects the affective aspects that accompany scientific thought primarily with the unconscious and with motivational drive.

Only the man who can conceive the gigantic effort and above all the devotion, without which original scientific thought cannot succeed, can measure the *strength of the feeling* from which alone such work ... can grow. (Koestler, 1969: 262; emphasis added)

For Koestler, as illustrated above, relevance of emotions for scientific reasoning lies in their capacity to function as a (more or less unconscious) source of creativity, and are accordingly considered as a sort of productive medium *for* scientific enterprises. Michael Polanyi makes a step further in the emancipation of emotion or feeling from the intuitive-irrational sphere of the mind and dares to claim that passions themselves have their own reason, what further enables him to state that there are correct and false modes of feeling; that, in other words, feelings can be correct, and so also justified, or incorrect, that is unjustified, the same way empirical data, or beliefs based on them, can be.

... science, by virtue of its *passionate note*, finds its place among the great systems of utterances which try to evoke and impose *correct modes of feeling*. In teaching his own kinds of formal excellence science functions like art, religion, morality, law and other constituents of culture. ... Science can then no longer hope to survive on an island of positive facts, around which the rest of man's intellectual heritage sinks to the status of subjective emotionalism. It must claim that *certain emotions are right*; and if it can make good such a claim, it will not only save itself but sustain by its example the whole system of cultural life of it forms part. (Polanyi: 1964: 133 and 134; my emphasis)

According to such a view, a feeling is less a product of a current state of physiological processes, it is much more a global inference from the entire experience, a totality of

significations which is more than a mere sum of constitutive elements. Thus Galileo's 'passionate appreciation' for the heliocentric view, in the example below, is not to be contributed to his temporary subjectivity but to a sort of maturation which brings about global synthesis which simply cannot be reduced to a mental algebra, because it takes into account many more elements that cannot be formally represented.

Real ground of Galileo's conviction lay in his *passionate appreciation* of the greater scientific value of the heliocentric view: a *feeling* which was accentuated by his angry rebellion against Aristotle's authority over science. (Polanyi, 1964: 152; emphasis added)

Polanyi was not the only one to recognize and appreciate the aesthetic component of mathematics and to relate this aspect to emotion or 'intellectual passion', but he was certainly among the few who was ready to bring the consequences [draw the ultimate conclusion] and conceive 'emotional colour' as a distinctive feature which may serve as a key for truth-criteria (particularly in the cases where there are from a technical point of view several equally satisfactory solutions).

Nowhere is intellectual beauty so deeply felt and fastidiously appreciated in its various grades and qualities as in mathematics, and only the informal appreciation of mathematical value can distinguish what is mathematics from a welter of formally similar, yet altogether trivial statements and operations. And we shall see that this *emotional colour of mathematics* also justifies its acceptance as *true*. It is by satisfying his *intellectual passions* that mathematics fascinates the mathematician and compels him to pursue it in his thoughts and give it his assent. (Polanyi, 1964: 188; emphasis added)

The 'emotional colouring' might just suggest something external, perhaps nice but not necessary element in the pursuit of mathematics, but that would be wrong. It should by no means be interpreted as a sort of contextual framework or background which we can but need not take into consideration, for it is constitutive part of intellectual mechanism which performs mathematical operations. The aesthetic element closely connected with it is also intellectual category rather than something for the sake of pleasure and appeal.

The inarticulate coefficient by which we understand and assent to mathematics is an active principle of this kind; it is a *passion for intellectual beauty*. It is on account of its intellectual beauty, which his own *passion* proclaims as revealing a universal truth, that the mathematician feels compelled to accept mathematics as true ... There is in fact ample evidence that such *intellectual passions* are intrinsic to the affirmation of mathematics. (Polanyi, 1964: 189; emphasis added)

Clearly, according to Polanyi, it is inadequate to take rational standards alone to do the selective and evaluative job in mathematics isolated from emotional criteria. The intellectual passions then do not only form an external context for the so called exact thought but these emotional attitudes are integral standards of scientific rationality.

Such an act can be said to be rational if it satisfies our standards of excellence, and the intellectual beauty of mathematics, upheld by the *passionate connoisseurship* of mathematics, is such a standard. (Polanyi, 1964: 189; emphasis added)

However, I think it would be wrong to get an impression from the above statements that emotional standards are always right, for that would be as inadequate as the contrary claim that everything based on emotion is necessarily wrong. Correctness and falsity of emotions has been out of my concern here; my interest in this essay was much more directed toward a recognition of the fact that emotions and reason are mutually related and also that the emotional is not excluded from the cognition.

It is along these lines of thought that conditions can be created for an extension of the argument which may enable us to bring knowing and doing, *Wissen* and *Können*, logic and aesthetics, cognition and emotion, and, in a final instance, science and art closer together.

Conclusions and Further Implications

A rough outline of a cognitive theory of emotion, as presented in the above, aimed first of all at a revision of a strictly polarized schema which isolates forms of rational knowledge from the forms of emotional life. This very supposition bears immediate relevance upon our conception of both the nature of cognition and the mind. Once admitted that 'emotional reasoning' is justified due to our belief that the intuitive or implicit exercises its impact upon the reason and also that reasoning shapes our sensitivity, habitual notions of cognition and the mind are not tenable any longer. For neither are forms of cognition as separated and specialized nor is the mind as compartmentalized as classical interpretations want us to believe.

By admitting emotions to become an element of cognition we reinforce, on the one hand, the *totality of cognitive act* and, on the other hand, the *wholeness of a cognitive subject* (or, better, person).

If emotions were something exclusively biological, or merely animal, there would be no changes in emotional attitudes and criteria. However, feelings as characteristic of human beings, are not just given and are also not given in an unchanged, eternal form. Forms of emotional life are molded and reshaped anew within a cultural context. Just as there is an evolution of ideas, there is a shifting of emotional standards; there is a cultivation and education of emotions, particularly under the influence of action and thought of the *rational animal*. Analogous to the growth of knowledge one could talk about the 'rise' and 'growth' of emotional competence.

In a final instance, I believe, a possible argument from the cognitive aspect of emotion touches upon the moral issues concerning our *freedom*. Emotional sphere (for which it can be rightly said to be much more variegated than for instance our mathematical reasoning) escapes complete determination which in turns creates preconditions for establishing of indeterminate and unpredictable cognitive links. It is also in this sense that we can perceive emotionality as a venue toward the *possible* or *unknown*. And bearing in mind that there is a close affiliation of the rational mind and the intuitive

mind, governed as it is by emotionality, there appears to exist potentials for reasonable acting that are not recognized by classical philosophy. Thus our answer to the question whether feelings are philosophically relevant in matters of human freedom is affirmative, and we can hence reinforce the stand by saying that "instead of denying human contingency and forcing our emotions to follow uniform patterns, the emotional life may enable us to achieve an exemption from a necessity which otherwise would dominate our actions." (Sontag, 1989: 40)

* The article is somewhat revised version of the essay formerly published in *Horizons of Humanity*, Z. Radman (ed.), Frankfurt am Main/Berlin/Bern/New York/Paris/Wien: Peter Lang, 1997.

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